NOTES by unknown
NOTES
WHEN IS A LABOR DISPUTE NOT A "LABOR DISPUTE"?
-JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW YORK
ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE*
JuoIcmL interpretation has consistently restricted the scope of state anti-
injunction statutes as applied to peaceful picketing, by reading the immuniz-
ing phrase "labor dispute" as a term of art, contrary to the usual construction
of its federal prototype.1 In general, labor groups picketing peacefully - and
* Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E. 2d 233 (1946).
1. NTorris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1940). For
compilation of state statutes see Comment, 53 YALE L. 3. 553 n. 1 (1944). Conpare Fur
Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, No. 21238, 105 F2d 1 (App. D.C.
1939), aff'd, 308 U. S. 522 (1939), and cases cited in Comment, 34 CALw. L. Ruv. 592, 593
n. 10 (1946), uith Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union of Brooklyn
and Queens, Local 287, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E.2d 480 (1942) (picketing after certification
of rival union). Compare United States v. American Federation of .Musicians, 47 F.
Supp. 304 (N.D.Il. 1942), aff'd, 318 U. S. 741 (1943), with Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber,
285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E.2d 349 (1941) (dispute over introduction of labor-saving machin-
ery). Compare Wilson & Co. v. Bin, 105 F.2d 948 (C.C.A. 3d 1939), uith, Simon v.
Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N. E.2d 1 (1938) (object of labor activity unlawful un-
der state law: closed shop). Compare Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (NND. Mo.
1939), uith Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E.2d 674 (1937) (dispute to in-
duce owner-operator to take on union employee). But cf. United States v. United Mine
Workers, 67 Sup. Ct 289 (1947) (Act does not apply to sovereign) ; Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U. S. 797 (1945) (combination with non-labor groups
puts labor group activities outside of Act's protection).
See generally FRANXFURTM AND GREEN4 THE LABOR IIVJUtcro!N (1930); 1
TELE, LABOR DisPUTEs AND CoLLEcTnE BARGAINING §§ 109-53; Feinberg, Pieeting,
Free Speech, and "Labor Disputes," 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. R-v. 385 (1940); Fraenkel, Jvdicial
Ilterpretation of Labor Laws, 6 U. OF CHL L. REv. 577, 532-93 (1939); Galenson and
Spector, The Aev York Labor-Injunction, Statute and the Courts, 42 COL L. R v. 51
(1942); Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L. J. 341 (1938);
Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Thicr Effects on) Industrial Warfare, 36 Mzcn. L
REv. 1237, 1255-9 (193S) ; Comments, 49 YA=m L.J. 537 (1940), 53 YALE LJ. 553 (1944),
34 CAIF. L. REv. 592 (1946), 59 H.Av. L. Rav. 1123 (1946); Notes, 120 A. L. R. 316
(1939), supplemen ted in; 124 A. L. R. 751 (1940) and 127 A. L. R. 868 (1940), 46 COL L
REv. 473, 860 (1946), 11 INT'L JURID. Ass'N, BuLy. 31 (1942).
2. Cf. Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, Local 830, 281 N. Y.
150, 22 N. E2d 320 (1939) (occurrence of violence justifies blanket injunction against all
picketing), fMAiAxo, THE BuscH JEwEmY SToREs LABOR I JuNcN IN1 ff. (1940);
Muncie Building Trades Council v. Umbarger, 215 Ind. 13, 17 N. E.2d S8 (1938) (in-
junction granted to third party in violent picketing situation). But ef. Cafeteria Em-
ployees' Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943) (isolated incidents of violence
do not justify injunction) ; Isolantite, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers, 132 N. J. Eq. 613, 29 A.2d 183 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (where violence has occurred,
statute still protects peaceful picketing) ; May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer,
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committing no independent torts must still meet two requirements before the
protection of the statute will be extended to them as parties to a "labor dis-
pute" :4 their objectives must be-"lawful" 5 and they must be in 'unity of inter-
est" with the party against whom the activities in question are directed.0 But
recently, in Schivera, v. Long Island Lighting Co.7 the New York Court of
Appeals intimated in an ambiguous opinion that the finding of a labor dis-
pute in the layman's sense may be sufficient to bar an injunction without
resort to judicial refinement.
The controversy in question arose over union recognition. The only non-
union contractor in the county was able to hire a sufficient number of non-
union workmen so that peaceful picketing by the local building trades council
had not interfered with his operations up to the time of the action. While
building a residential development, he sold the first completed home to plain-
tiff, a prospective occupier. Utility workers, dispatched at plaintiff's request
282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E.2d 279 (1940) (same); see Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139
Fed. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905). The possibility of peaceful picketing was at first
denied.
3. Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568, 20 N. E.2d 969 (1939) (picketing with false pla-
cards is enjoinable). Cf. Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v. Davis, 290 N. Y. 101, 48 N. E.2d 280
(1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 774 (1943) (where court finds no labor dispute, picketing
with "unfair" signs is enjoined as involving misrepresentation). But ef. Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943) ("loose language" by pickets
does not justify injunction) ; Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture
Operators' Union, 273 N. Y. 647, 8 N. E.2d 320 (1937) (trial court judgment requiring
pickets.to add explanatory words on placards set aside).
4. But "One need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to have a right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter by publication,
unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive." Jackson,
J. in Bakery and Pastry Drivers' and Helpers' Union v. Wohi, 315 U. S. 769, 774 (1942) ;
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. 5& 321 (1941) (state law cannot limit
peaceful picketing to dispute between employer and his own employees) ; Anora Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N. Y. S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (peaceful picketing
by Negro youth organization to induce employment of Negroes in theatre cannot be en-
joined despite absence of labor dispute) ; Friedman v. Blumberg, 342 Pa. 387, 23 A.2d 412
(1941) (absence of employer-employee relationship did not permit injunction against
peaceful picketing of glazier employing only occasional help) ; S and W Fine Foods, Inc.
v. Retail Delivery Drivers' and Salesmen's Union, Local No. 353, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118
P.2d 962 (1941) (absence of employer-employee relationship between picketers and
picketed employer did not permit injunction against peaceful picketing, although court
found no labor dispute).
5. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union of Brooklyn and
Queens, Local 287, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E.2d 480 (1942); and see cases cited note 19
infra.
6. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E.2d 910 (1937) (delicatessen store
and sausage factory) ; and see cases cited notes 15-17 infra. See also Hellerstein, supra
note 1.
7. 296 N. Y. 26, 69 N. E2d 233 (1946), 47 COL. L. REv. 327 (1947), 6 LAW. GuIu
R-v. 650 (1946), 14 U. oF Cm. L. Ray. 493 (1947).
[Vol, 561252
to perform the utility company's statutory duty8 to connect the gas and elec-
tricity, asked the pickets whether they would be permitted to cross the picket
line, since their closed shop contract with the utility specified that they would
not be required to cross AFL picket lines. When the pickets replied that they
"had instructions not to allow any utilities to do any work whatsoever in the
community . . .", the workers turned back, and the utility subsequently re-
fused to perform the work, on the ground that a utility workers' strike para-
lyzing service generally in the area would result.10 Plaintiff then brought suit,
apparently at the instigation of the contractor, to enjoin the picketing as
against himself, and to compel the utility to perform its statutory duty. The
utility union was not joined as a party.1 The injunction and mandamus were
granted in the trial court, and the picketing union alone appealed, securing a
reversal in the Appellate Division,'- on the sole ground that the case grew out
of a labor dispute within the meaning of the New York anti-injunction stat-
ute. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a four-to-three decision.
Any examination of the doctrinal background for injunctions against peace-
ful picketing must be preceded by noting a relevant caveat: Even at common
law, derivative harm resulting to a plaintiff as a consequence of labor activities
otherwise legal, and not directed against him, is no grounds for an injunction
or damages, although no "unity of interest" exists between the parties to the
suit.' 3 But if the picketers' instructions are taken to indicate that the plaintiff
was an object of the picketing,14 at least to the extent that harm to him could
not be considered derivative, then an injunction might well have issued, on
either or both of the traditional grounds that the object was unlawful and the
necessary unity of interest lacking.
Under the New York doctrine of unity of interest, picketing can "follow
the product" as long as the placards plainly so indicate,'0 but only when the
8. NEWV YoRK TRANSPoRTATIox CoRPoRArioNs LAw § 12.
9. 296 N. Y. 26, 30, 69 N. E2d 233, 234 (1946).
10. This circumstance was brought out in conversations with Messrs. I. Cyrus Gor-
don and Carl Rachlin, counsel for defendant union, who were extremely helpful in pro-
viding background material.
11. Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 61 N. Y. S2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See
note 10 supra.
12. Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 270 App. Div. 852, 60 N. Y. S2d 793 (2d
Dep't 1946).
13. RFsrA.TEmE, ToRTs § 809 (1939). Norman v. Sullivan, 185 Misc. 957, 57
N. Y. S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (injunction denied to apartment house tenant seeking to
compel landlord to provide elevator service, and to prohibit union from interfering there-
with). Cf. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Ec-
change Bakery & Restaurant v. Rivkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132-3 (1927).
14. As the court stated these instructions, the pickets were "not to allow any utilities
to do any work whatsoever in the community... ." 296 N. Y. 26, 30, 69 N. E.2d 233, 234
(1946).
15. Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 225 App. Div. 735, 232 N. Y. Supp.
886 (1st Dep't 1928) (picketing of retailer permitted with banners which did not mention
name of retailer employing non-union window cleaners); Commercial House & Window
NOTES 125319471
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one picketed is "in the same business for profit."16 Thus, if plaintiff had been
a real estate operator, or a commercial builder who had bought the property
in order to complete construction without being hampered by a picket line, the
union would probably have met the unity of interest test.17 But since he was
a private buyer and householder, plaintiff would probably be without the
scope of the controversy, although in a sense the controversy had moved away
from the product, rather than the product from it.18
Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 138 Misc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (all picket-
ing enjoined where banners mentioned retailer's name) ; ef. cases cited note 3 supra.
16. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E.2d 910, 913 (1937). The con-
stitutionality" of the "follow the product" doctrine, not yet tested by the Supreme Court,
has been somewhat shaken, as evidenced by the policy behind American Federation of La-
bor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) (state court reversed for granting injunction which
restricted picketing by others than employees of the employer picketed) and Bakery and
Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942) (state court reversed
for granting injunction against picketing of peddlers employing no help, on ground that
there was no showing of illegality other than absence of a "labor dispute"). But cf. Car-
penters and Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942)
(state court upheld in granting injunction against picketing cafe owned by plaintiff who
had hired non-union contractor to build structure for him in another part of town).
Where the Court will draw the line between the Ritter's cafe and the Swing and Wohl
fact situations remains to be seen.
17. Compare People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E.2d 206 (1941) (retailer-lessee
and manufacturer-lessor of burglar alarm system: sufficient unity of interest), with
People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E.2d 238 (1939) (retailer-vendee and inanufac-
turer-vendor of burglar alarm system: insufficient unity of interest). Cornpare Manhat-
tan Steam Bakery v. Schindler, 250 App. Div. 467, 294 N. Y. Supp. 783 (2d Dep't 1937)
(delivery service patron and delivery service: sufficient unity of interest), with Chapman
v. Doe, 255 App. Div. 893, 7 N. Y. S.2d 470 (3rd Dep't 1938) (same facts: insufficient
unity of interest). Compare Davega-City Radio v. Randau, 166 Misc. 246, 1 N. Y. S.2d
514 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (retailer-advertiser and newspaper in which advertisements placed:
sufficient unity of interest), with Gertz v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N. Y. Supp. 871
(Sup. Ct. 1937) (same facts: insufficient unity of interest).
Sufficient unity of interest was found in the following cases: Devon Knitwedr v.
Levenson, N. Y. L. J. Feb. 29, 1940, p. 940, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (jobber and contractor
in garment industry); Willoughby Camera Stores v. McDonough, N. Y. L. J. June 20,
1939, p. 2850, col. 5. July 11, 1939, p. 79, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (camera store and film
processor) ; People v. Briesblatt, 34 N. Y. S.2d 184 (Sullivan County Ct. 1942) (hotel
and bakery).
Insufficient unity of interest was found in the following cases: Canepa v. Doe, 277
N. Y. 52, 12 N. E.2d 790 (1938) (retailer-vendee and manufacturer-vendor of neon sign) ;
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Hawley, 176 Misc. 821, 28 N. Y. S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct.
1941), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 953, 27 N. Y. S.2d 423 (1st Dep't 1941) (cosmetics manufac-
turer and manufacturer of ingredient not forming major portion of product) ; Back v.
Kaufman, 175 Misc. 169, 22 N. Y. S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (dentist and dental labora-
tory) ; Feldman v. Weiner, 173 Misc. 461, 17 N. Y. S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (butcher
and fat-rendering concern to whom he sells waste fat) ; ef. Consolidated Realty Co, v.
Dyers, Finishers and 'Bleachers Federation, 137 N. J. Eq. 413, 45 A.2d 132 (Ch. 1946)
(court will look through corporate veil to find unity of interest).
18. Cf. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722 (1942).
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NOTES
Nor could the union meet the lawfulness of objective test,"0 under this
interpretation of the facts of the case. Although the picketing here was aimed
at securing union recognition,2 0 it had as an ancillary objective the prevention
of any utility work in the area. The latter objective can itself be subdivided
into preventing utility employees from carrying out their jobs, and preventing
the utility itself from performing its statutory duty. The common law duty
of employees in businesses affected with the public interest to carry on their
work as long as they continue in that employment, is not entirely clear ;21 but
19. Retail Clerks' Union No. 779 v. Lerner Shops, 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939)
(picketing to induce employer to sign dosed shop contract is unlawful) ; Roth v. Local
Union No. 1460, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E.2d 2-30 (1939) (same); R. H. White Co. v.
Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E.2nd 685 (1942) (same) ; Schwab v. Moving Picture Ma-
chine Operators' Local No. 159, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941) (scinble). Conrra:
Eastlake Drug Co. v. Pharmacists and Drug Clerks' Union, 210 Minn. 433, 293 N. IV. 722
(1941) ; Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 129 N. J. Eq.
570, 576, 19 A.2nd 661, 664 (Ct Err. & App. 1941) ; Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12
N. E2nd 547 (1938), cert. disniisscd, 303 U. S. 621 (1938) (strike for dosed shop law-
ful).
Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, 121 N. J. Eq. 588, 191 At. 774 (Ct. Err. & App.
1937) (picketing by laundry routemen with placards requesting public not to deal with
employer is enjoinable as violation of employees' contracts); cf. Greater City Master
Plumbers v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (strike in breach of union con-
tract is unlawful). But cf. Cascade Laundry, Inc. Y. Volk, 129 N. J. Eq. 603, 20 A2d 505
(Ch. 1941) (striking laundry routemen may not be enjoined from directing business away
from their employer, in violation of their contracts).
Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union of Brooklyn and Queens,
Local 287, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E.2d 480 (1942) (jurisdictional picketing after labor
board certification is unlawful) ; Markham & Callow, Inc. v. Int'l Woodworkers, 170 Ore.
517, 135 P2d 727 (1943) (same); Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. Inel woodworkers,
4 Wash.2d 62, 102 P.2d 270 (1940) (same). But cf. Stone Logging & Contracting Co. v.
Int'l Woodworkers, 171 Ore. 13, 135 P.2d 759 (1943) (picketing lawful where closed shop
contract not yet certified by NLRB). Contra: Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 165 P2d 891 (1946) (picketing and use of "un-
fair" list lawful after NLRB certification of rival union; no anti-injunction statute).
Cf. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E2d 349 (1941) (inducing
another union to strike to compel abandonment of labor-saving machinery by joint em-
ployer is unlawful); Burlington Transportation Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Iowa 135, 12
N. V.2d 167 (1943) (union can be enjoined from ordering members, employees of com-
mon carrier, not to handle goods of picketed shipper; no anti-injunction statute).
See also Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25.
20. A lawful objective in New York. Airport Hotel Co. v. Mannix, 6 LAn. RE.,. Rzu.
M x. 1105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S.
321 (1941).
21. The rationale has not found direct expression in New York law since Burgess
Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1920), but in a series of
recent hospital cases the courts have simply denied the right to strike. Jewish Hospital of
Brooklyn v. Hospital Employees Union, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (2d
Dep't 1937) ; Society of New York Hospital v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 937, 59 N. .. S2d 91
(Sup. Ct. 1945) (peaceful picketing excepted, although strike enjoined) ; Beth-El Hos-
pital v. Robbins, 186 Misc. 506, 60 N. Y. S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (same) ; Cf. Elizabeth
1947] 1255
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the statutory duty of the utility is plain,2 2 and although impossibility may
excuse specific performance, 23 the company must still respond in damages.2 4
The picketing union was therefore attempting to and did in fact induce the
breach of a legal duty, an object which prior to this decision would have
placed it without the scope of the anti-injunction statute.25 For where a labor
activity is carried on with more than one objective, the fact that any one is un-
lawful has been sufficient, as long as it continues, to taint the entire enter-
prise.
20
General Hospital and Dispensary v. Elizabeth General Hospital Employees, 4 CCH LAD.
CAs. 61,747 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (picketing enjoined); Western Pennsylvania Hospital v.
Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206 (1941) (hospital not within scope of anti-injunction
statute). Contra: Northwestern Hospital v. Public Service Employees Union, 208 Minn.
389, 294 N. W. 215 (1940).
Some courts have held the Fourteenth Amendment to bar injunctions against refusal
to do specific work. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 19, 18
So.2d 810, 824 (1944), cert. dimnissed, 325 U. S. 450 (1944) (statute making it unlawful
for any employee to refuse to handle or work on goods because non-union processed or
delivered held unconstitutional), New Bedford Fish Co. v. United Sea Food Workers of
Philadelphia,,Local 20384, 2 LAB. REL. RFa. MAN. 791 (U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1938) (no
injunction will be granted to compel union members to handle fish company shipments
refused because of strike against another company renting space on same wharf, since
that would be involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment).
Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup. Ct. 289 (1947) (strike against
government enjoined) ; Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31 (1942) (strike
by seamen on board vessel docked at safe domestic port not home port is mutiny).
22. NEW YORK TRANSPORTATION CORPORATIONS LAW § 12. CI. Stephens v. Ohio
State Telephone Co., 240 Fed. 759 (N.D. Ohio 1917), Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. v. Burlington,
C. R. & N. Ry., 34 Fed. 481 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888); Burlington Transportation Co. v.
Hathaway, 234 Iowa 135, 12 N. W.2d 167 (1943); McCran v. Public Service Ry., 95
N. J. Eq. 22, 122 Atl. 205 (Ch. 1923) ; Louder v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. 14 Misc. 208,
35 N. Y. Supp. 996 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Geismer v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 102 N. Y,
'563, 7 N. E. 828 (1886) ; Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Thompson, 235 S. W. 913 (Tex, Civ.
App. 1921).
23. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chi. M. St. P. & P.R.R., 15 U. S. L. W=ap 2545 (ICC,
March 14, 1947); Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 158 F.2d 109, 188 (C.C.A,
7th 1946), 56 YALE L. J. 738; Reardon v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 189 App. Div. 515,
178 N. Y. Supp. 722 (2nd Dep't 1919). But cf. Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Dep't
of Public Service, 200 Wash. 659, 94 P.2d 484 (1939) (truck line not excused from order-
ing employees through shipper's picket line, despite union threat to call strike if employees
permitted to go through). See Note, 35 HARv. L. Ray. 623 (1922).
24. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chi. M. St. P. & P.R.R., 15 U. S. L. WEEsK 2545 (ICC
March 14, 1947); Morrison v. St. L.-S.F.R.R., 264 S. W. 449 (Mo. App. 1924), Buschow
Lumber Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. 276 S. W. 409 (Mo. App. 1925) ; Blackstock v. N.Y. &
E.R.R., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859). But cf. Ritchie v. Oregon Short Line, 42 Idaho 193, 244 Pac.
580 (1926). See Note, 45 A. L. R. 919 (1926).
25. See cases cited note 19 mpra. Note 149 A. L. R. 1243, 1247 (1944).
26. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 796. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1403 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N. W.2d 698 (1943). See Restatement,
Torts, Minutes of Conferences of Reporters and Advisers, Aug. 1937-Nov. 1938, v. 3, sec.
5, pp. 40 ff. (unpublished).
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NOTES
The opinion of the court is never clear whether the injunction is denied
because the injury to plaintiff was merely derivative; because the court has
widened the circle of labor's valid objectives and legitimate adversaries; or be-
cause, in despite of doctrine, the mere finding of a labor dispute in the
layman's sense is sufficient to invoke the protection of the statute. While a
possible interpretation of the facts supports the first theory, the court's state-
ment of the facts suggests the last one, as does its initial observation that in
picketing the builder, the union members were exercising a "constitutional
right."'27 Furthermore, if they were picketing only the builder, the ensuing
discussion of the application of the anti-injunction statute would have been
unnecessary.28 But the cases cited by the plaintiff-3 are distinguished on the
ground that "they involve either secondary boycotts [no unit, of interest] or
violent or otherwise intrinsically unlawful strikes or picketing."33 Although
the court disclaims any intention to reverse its former holdings, the facts of
its holding in the instant case may imply at least a narrower definition of what
is a secondary boycott or "intrinsically unlawful" picketing.
Judge Fuld's concurrence is somewhat more clear. He terms the harm to
the plaintiff "only an incidental effect, not the primary objective of the picket-
ing",.31 but he uses the case as a springboard from which to launch an attack
on the restrictive interpretation of the anti-injunction statute. Construing
most broadly the language of the most liberal cases,a 2 he concludes that neither
unity of interest nor lawful objectives are prerequisites for statutory protec-
tion, going on to point out that "the statute is 'endered meaningless unless it
is allowed to operate in those cases where plaintiff is entitled to some relief
[at common law]."a3
In short, then, the harm suffered by plaintiff was not clearly derivative, and
if the usual tests had been applied, he would probably have been entitled to an
injunction. Since the injunction was denied, and since the Court did not spell
out a rationale, either in terms of derivative harm, or unity of interest and
27. 296 N. Y. 26, 29, 69 N. E.2d 233 (1946).
28. And a second reference to constitutional rights, in the penultimate paragraph, sug-
gests an emphasis on the constitutional question that would be unnecessary in a simple
case of derivative harm. Compare Carpenters' Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722
(1942), uit/z Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
29. 296 N. Y. 26, 27, 69 N. E.2d 233 (1946). A selection of these cases is cited in
notes 5 and 19 supra.
30. 296 N.Y. 26,32,69N. E.2d 233, 235 (1946).
31. Id. at 33, 69 N. E._d at 235. Although not the primary objective, plaintiff's depriva-
tion might have been a secondary objective of the picketing, within this language. See note
26mspra.
32. People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E.2d 206 (1941) ; May's Furs & Ready-to-
Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 341, 26 N. E.2d 279, 284 (1940); Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch, 276 N. Y. 281. 11 N. E.2d 910 (1937).
33. Cf. Remington Rand v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th
Dep't 1936) (anti-injunction statute is only declaratory of the common law, and doas not
make its scope or meaning clear).
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lawfulness of object, there is an intimation, although not a square holding,
that the two judicially developed requirements are being judicially aban-
doned.34
Such a change in attitude may serve to clarify somewhat a highly confused
field of law,35 and provide a salutary check on judicial impulse.3 0 The statute
still cannot be read as an absolute prohibition against labor injunctions. It
contains within itself adequate restrictions as to means employed.37 And, un-
less one makes the unwarranted assumption of absolute constitutional im-
munity for peaceful picketing,38 the lack of any limitations on the aims of or
the persons towards whom the activity is directed 9 may result in a policy
conflict with other statutes. If, therefore, the courts are forced to make their
decisions in terms of conflicting *statutory policies, rather than judicially-
constructed standards, judicial legislation will be properly relegated to its
interstitial role, subordinate to the direct action of the legislature.
SPECIFIC AND PERFECTED LIENS V. FEDERAL PRIORITY
IN RECEIVERSHIPS::
THE Federal Government's right to be accorded first priority from the
- funds of an insolvent estate in equity receivership is exclusively statutory.1
34. It should be noted here that other law journals have not so read the opinion, but
have confined themselves largely to a discussion of the derivative harm aspects of the case.
See note 7 unpra.
35. See Galenson and Spector, stepra note 1, at 69, and cases cited note 17 supra.
36. ". . . In these instances, the justification is that the defendant is privileged know-
ingly to inflict the damage complained of. But whether, and how far, a privilege shall be
allowed is a question of policy. Questions of policy are legislative questions, and judges
are shy of reasoning from such grounds." Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 3 (1894). See Fraenkel, szpra note 1, at 592; 53 YALE L.J. 553, 561 ff.
37. Picketing is only protected when it is conducted by any method "not involving
fraud, violence, or breach of the Peace.. .. " NEw YoRx CIVIL PRAc'rxc Acr § 876-a
1(f) (5).
38. "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves pa-
trol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action
of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis-
seminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation."
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Bakery and Pastry Drivers' and Helpers' Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 776 (1942).
39. Nmv YORK CIVIL PRAmcCE AcT § 876-a 1 (f). Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105
F. 2d 948 (C.C.A.3d 1939) (no restrictions on object of protected labor activity under
Norris-LaGuardia Act).
* Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
1. REV. STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. §191 (1940). "Whenever any person in-
debted to the United States is insolvent, . . . the debts due to the United States shall be
first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which
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Although the applicability of the statute has long been restricted to situations
in which the debtor has committed one of the prescribed acts indicative of in-
solvency, 2 the full extent of its impact upon private claims is yet undecided.
When the statute comes into play, unsecured demands are subordinated3 and
consensual liens are probably preserved,4 but the status of the specific and
perfected lien remains undetermined after years of discussion in dicta2
This question was again raised in dictum by the Supreme Court in Illinois ex
a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assign-
ment thereof,.. as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." Judicial con-
struction, denying that the federal priority rests upon sovereign prerogative, has limited
the right to the asserted statutory provisions. See United States v. State Bank of North
Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U.S. 1832); Blair, Priority of the United States in Equity Re-
ceiverships, 39 HRv. L. Rrv. 1, 2-4 (1925) ; Logan, Priorities and Lien Preferences Ac-
corded Federal and State Claims in Corporate Reorgani:ations, 16 TAx MAG. 201, 202
(1938). However, the common law prerogative still exists in some states. Georgia:
Booth v. State, 131 Ga. 750, 63 S. E. 502 (190) ; Montana: American Bonding Co. v.
Reynolds, 203 Fed. 356 (D. Mont. 1913) ; New York: Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S.
380 (1920); Tennessee: Maryland Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. NV.
410 (1924); West Virginia: Woodyard v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689 (1922).
See Crane, A Royal Prerogative in the United States, 34 W. VA. L. Q. 317, 321 (1928).
2. Conceivably the statute might have been applied to all cases of insolvency, but
such an interpretation would have ignored the effect of the second clause vhich the
courts have construed as limitative rather than illustrative. Mere inability to pay debts
does not invoke the statute. Prince v. Bartlett, 8 Cranch 431 (U. S. 1814); United
States v. Canal Bank, 25 Fed. Cas. 277, No. 14,715 (C. C. D. Me. 1844). The voluntary
assignment must cover entire assets; a partial assignment is insufficient. United States
v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1805).
3. See note 15 infra.
4. See Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596 (U. S. 1836) (by-laws of creditor
bank gave it a right to set off debts owed by stockholder before transferring stock; this
held to defeat executor's suit to have all the stock transferred with which to pay federal
claim) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) (property assigned to
creditor to secure loan) ; United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1805) (mortgaged
property).
Moreover, lower federal courts have uniformly held that the expenses of administra-
tion are deductible from the fund before distribution to any preferred creditor, including
the United States. Kennebec Box Co. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (C. C. A.
2nd 1925) ; United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; United States
v. Eggleston, 25 Fed. Cas. 979, No. 15,027 (C. C. D. Ore. 1877).
However, state exemption laws do not apply to debts due the Federal Government.
United States v. Howell, 9 Fed. 674 (C. C. V. D. N.C. 1881). Contra: Postmaster
General v. Robbins, 19 Fed. Cas. 1126, No. 11,314 (D. Me. 1829).
5. The Court has expressly reserved decision many times; see United States v.
Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353, 355 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314
U. S. 480, 485-6 (1941) ; New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294 (1933) ; Spokane
County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 95 (1929) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1
Pet. 386, 442 (U. S. 1828). See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United
States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HAns. L. RE%. 251, 264-73 (1929);
Blair, supra note 1, at 23-4; Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Col-
lection of Federal Taxes, 95 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 739, 746-7 (1947).
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rel. Gordon v. Campbell.6 There, after a private creditor had obtained judgment
against an insolvent corporation, upon which execution had issued, the State of
Illinois sued to enforce a prior statutory lien for unemployment compensation
contributions and succeeded in having a receiver appointed. Subsequently, the
Collector of Internal Revenue intervened and filed claims for federal taxes,
alleging that the claims of the United States were entitled to priority under
Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, a contention denied by Illinois on the
ground, among others, that the state's statutory lien on the debtor's property
gave it precedence over the federal claims. A majority of the Court, finding
that a general equity receivership' bad been effected, ruled that the statutory
lien was not sufficiently specific and perfected, for Illinois had not specified
exactly what property was subject to the lien nor had it completed the pro-
.cedural steps of enforcing the lien by obtaining execution on the property.
7
It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether a fully perfected lien over-
came the federal priority; but the Court warned that its previous statement in
Knott v. United States that "(s)uch an interest (an inchoate general lien
created by the laws of Florida) lacks the characteristics of a specific perfected
lien which alone bars the priority of the United States"8 had been merely
dictum and not intended to decide the issue.9 However, since this dictum has
beer repeated so frequently by the Court that it has virtually been accepted
by lower federal and state courts as a rule of property law, 10 the caveat that
it is still an open question makes appropriate a reexamination of principles
and precedents..
In the early leading case of Thelusson v. Snith, the Court stated as dictum
that "the United States are to be first satisfied; but then, it must be out of the
debtor's estate!"' and added that property "divested out of the debtor . ..
cannot be made liable to the United States."'12 Desiring nevertheless to pro-
tect the federal priority from undue limitations at the hands of state legisla-
tures and courts, the Court in later cases continued to utilize this concept of
divestment of title or possession as a check upon the claims of competing
creditors. Limits were laid down. Thus, it is well established that a mort-
6. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
7. Id. at 372-6.
8. 298 U. S. 544, 551 (1936).
9. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 n.10 (1946).
10. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F2d 533, 537 (C. C. A. 8th 1929), aff'd,
280 U. S. 478 (1930). For examples of adherence to the proposition, see United States
v. Cutts, 25 Fed. Cas. 745, No. 14,912 (C. C. D. N. H. 1832) (equitable lien created by
assignment of stock to secure loan held superior to federal priority) ; Lerman v. Lincoln
Novelty Co., 130 N. J. Eq. 144, 21 A.2d 827 (Ch. 1941) (lien termed not specific and
perfected and therefore held subordinate to federal priority) ; State v. Wynne, 134 Tex.
455, 133 S. W.2d 951 (1939), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
310 U. S. 610 (1940) (statutory lien for taxes held specific and therefore superior to
federal priority).




gagee's claim defeats the federal priority on the theory that title has passed, 3
at least in those states where the title theory prevails.' 4 On the other hand
inchoate general liens are subordinate to the priority, since they merely entitle
a creditor to obtain execution through subsequent legal process.'3  Into this
framework the Supreme Court has attempted to fit the specific and perfected
lien. Apparently recognizing the commercial use of liens as a form of se-
curity, the Court has stated that "it has never yet been decided, by this Court,
that the priority of the United States will divest a specific lien, attached to a
thing, whether it be accompanied by possession, or not" ;20 but on the other
hand, the Court has always managed to avoid a square holding that the pri-
ority will not divest such a lien by reasoning that the particular lien involved
was not sufficiently specific and perfected to present the direct question.'7
As a result of this process of negative definition, the Court has gradually
formulated its requirements of specificity and perfection, the absence of
which defeats a lien. Underlying them is discernible the Court's suspicion of
those lienholders who have neglected to assert their statutory rights until the
debtor has become insolvent, whereas it views more favorably those who,
prior to insolvency, have taken affirmative action to protect their interests. As
to specificity, the lien must be definite in at least three respects. The lienor
himself must be clearly identified: a lien on securities, deposited with a state
official, for the benefit of possible future creditors of a surety company vas
termed inchoate for lack of an ascertained holder.18 The debt underlying the
lien must be certain in amount: obligations accruing in the future, such as
rent to become due, in the case of a landlord's lien,1' and state taxes either as
yet unassessed20 or subject to future judicial determination 2 ' have been held
13. See, e.g., Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 428
(1898); Field v. United States, 9 Pet. 182, 201 (U. S. 1835); Conard v. Atlantic In-
surance Co., 1 Pet 386, 441 (U. S. 1828) ; Thelusson v. Smith, 2 'Wheat 396, 425 (U. S.
1817). But cf. The Melissa Tras!; 285 Fed. 781 (D. Mass. 1923).
14. Whether the same holds true for those jurisdictions inhere a mortgage is re-
garded as creating only a lien is a question about which the Court has e.xpressly refused
to speculate. See New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294 (1933).
15. E.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States
v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353 (1945) ; United States v. Temas, 314 U. S.
480 (1941); United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 283
U. S. 290 (1933) ; Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. E0 (1929) ; Thelusson v.
Smith, 2 Wheat 396 (U. S. 1817).
16. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 441 (U. S. 182).
17. See cases cited note 15 supra.
18. United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544, 550-1 (1936).
19. United States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353, 357-8 (1945). Al-
though future rent was computable from the lease, the possibility of a set-off or of the
termination of the lease rendered the amount uncertain.
20. New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 292 (1933). The New York statute pro-
vided that the state acquired a lien at the beginning of the year for which the franchise
tax was due, even though the amount of the tax was not then fixed.
21. United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 487 (1941). The tax statute was con-
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not sufficiently specific. Finally, the property attached must be specifically
designated: "property devoted to or used in (the debtor's) business" has been
held to be "neither specific nor constant."
'22
With respect to the perfection of a statutory lien on personal property the
Court has emphasized the concept of "divestment." The creditor must have
perfected the lien to the extent of a seizure, levy, distraint, or other legal proc-
ess upon the property charged, so that the goods are legally severed from the
general assets of the debtor.23 The Court has still to rule how far this en-
forcement process must be carried. While any final determination of "divest-
ment" remains a question for the Court,24 a minimal requirement would seem
to be that the seizure or distraint be advanced to the point where by state law
the debtor is divested of his possessory interest.2 Prior to such a step, a
statutory lien, though specific as to amount and the personal property charged
and, if publicly filed, sufficient to put subsequent purchasers and creditors on
notice, would amount to no more than a declaration of priority in insolvency
distribution, subordinate to the federal priority.26 Even though such a lien
were verbally stamped by the state legislature as specific and perfected, it is
extremely doubtful whether it would be considered by the Court superior to
strued as reserving to the court enforcing the lien the determination of the amount of
the tax, since the statute declared'the tax reports merely "prima facie evidence" of the
amount.
22. United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 487 (1941). Similarly, in the instant case,
the statutory lien was created "upon all the personal property ...owned ...by any
employer and used by him in connection with his trade, occupation, profession or busi-
ness," and the debtor had to file a schedule of all such property. ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 48,
§§ 243 (a), (e) (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946). The Supreme Court held that not until the
filing of this schedule, which did not occur before the priority statute was invoked,
would the state know the particular property to which the lien attached. 329 U.S. at
372-4.
23. E.g., Illinois ex ref. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375-6 (1946); United
States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353, 358-9 (1945) (the distraint requi-
site to sever the property fronm the general assets occurred twelve days after RMv, STAT.
§3466 took effect by reason of the voluntary assignment); New York v. Maclay, 288
U. S. 290, 294 (1933) (prior to divestment, inchoate lien served "merely as a caveat of
a more perfect lien to come") ; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 488 (1941) ; Spo-
kane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 93-4 (1929) ; Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat.
396, 425 (U. S. 1817).
24. United States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353, 356-7 (1945),
criticized on this point in 19 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 244, 248-50 (1946).
25. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 3Z9 U. S. 362, 371 (1946); Spokane
County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 94 (1929).
26. See United States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, 323 U. S. 353, 359 (1945)
(prior to distraint, lien merely gave landlord priority in distribution of goods on prem-
ises) ; cf.. Stover v. Scotch Hills Coal Co., 4 F.2d 748 (W. D. Pa. 1924) and United
States v. San Juan County, 280 Fed. 120 (W. D. Wash. 1922) (in both cases, the stat-
utory lien was viewed as a competing bid for priority, with the federal priority held
superior under the supremacy clause). See Rogge, supra note 5, at 269-70.
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the federal priority.2 However, when the statutory lien is on real property for
realty taxes levied in rent, the Court has implied that the public filing of the
tax delinquency would constitute sufficient perfection of the lien.2
Since equity receiverships and bankruptcy proceedings deal with similar
problems in the distribution of assets, the treatment of liens in the Bankruptcy
Act provides an instructive analogy. Unless the Bankruptcy Act specifically
invalidates a lien or renders it voidable by the trustee, the lien remains valid
after the debtor is adjudicated bankrupt and, with minor exceptions, -0 is su-
perior to any priority accorded by Section 64 of the Act. °0 In addition, the
Bankruptcy Act is more lenient in validating some liens which would not meet
the Court's requirements of specificity and perfection for preservation in re-
ceiverships: under Section 67(b), for example, statutory liens inchoate upon
the adjudication of bankruptcy may be made valid if thereafter perfected
within the time permitted by the statute' 1
Moreover, the priority philosophy of the Bankruptcy Act undercuts the in-
stant issue. The changes in the relative order of priorities in Section 64 of the
Act, effected principally by amendments in 1898, 1926 and 1938, relegate the
non-tax claims of the sovereign beneath claims for the administrative ex-
penses of the estate, laborers' wages, certain litigation costs, and state as well
as federal taxes, 3 2 reflecting a change in Congressional attitude toward the
equitable distribution of assets.3 3 Even the proposition that the federal pri-
27. Hypothetically, if a statute, in addition, were to declare the debtor immediately
divested without any judicial proceedings, the Court might well consider the lien pr-
fected; but the constitutional objections to such legislation are obvious. See Rogge,
suPra note 5, at 269-70.
28. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 94 (1929) (drawing the dis-
tinction between liens arising from taxes levied in personom and those from taxes levied
in rem and holding that the prescribed procedure for perfecting the former, including
divestment, had not been completed). See Note, 26 Mfix.. L. REv. 761 (1942).
29. 52 STAT. 877 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §107(c) (1940). Sec. 67(c) of the Act pro-
vides that all statutory liens on personal property not accompanied by possession of such
property and all liens of distress for rent shall be postponed in payment to the adninis-
trative costs and expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding and wage claims, which are en-
titled to first and second priority respectively under § 64(a). See 4 Co T ma, B,%;K-
RUPTcy §67.27 (14th ed. 1942).
30. City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174 (1919); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 195
U. S. 516 (1905) ; In re Tresslar, 20 F.2d 663 (M. D. Ala. 1927) ; 4 CoLLIm, B:;a-
RuprcY §67.02 (14th ed. 1942).
31. 52 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §107(b) (1940). United States v. Sampsell, 153
F.2d 731 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), 59 HIv. L. Rnv. 794.
32. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §104(a) (1940).
33. "The act takes into consideration, we think, the whole range of indebtedness of
the bankrupt, national, state and individual, and assigns the order of payment. The
policy which dictated it was beneficent and well might induce a postponement of the
claims, even of the sovereign in favor of those who necessarily depended upon their daily
labor!' Guarantee Title and Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 224 U. S. 15Z
160 (1912). "Public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the sovereign
has changed." Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315, 318 (1925).
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ority should be liberally construed in regard to claims for taxes "upon mo-
tives of public policy, in order to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the
public burdens 34 is negatived by the fact that Congress' most recent expres-
iion of public policy on the disposition of debtors' estates reaffirmed the rele-
gation of tax claims to fourth priority.3
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has held that the Government's statutory
priority in non-bankruptcy proceedings was not impliedly amended by these
changes in the Bankruptcy Act.a6 As a matter of statutory construction this
seems correct, but the fact remains that the Congressional attitude toward the
sovereign's priority has changed since the turn of the nineteenth century when
the statute was originally enacted to implement the collection of revenue.
In addition to these claims for revenue, however, the Court has extended
the applicability of the statute to contract rights of some of the administrative
agencies of the Federal Government.37 This priority frequently places on
competing private creditors a burden inconsistent with Congress' remedial
policy in initially creating those agencies. The anomalous result is to discour-
age to some degree the grant of private credit to those whom the Government
through such agencies as the Federal Housing Administration and Farm
Credit Administration seeks to aid financially3 8
To refrain from broadening still further the scope of federal priority by
enlarging the amount of assets available for satisfaction of the sovereign's
claims, the Supreme Court should hold a specific and perfected lien superior
to the priority statute. Such a decision would be in accord not only with the
Court's precedents but also with more recent Congressional attitude as ex-
pressed in the Bankruptcy Act.
34. United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U. S. 1832). For
re-affirmation of liberal construction, see United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 426
(1941) ; Bramwell v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 269 U. S. 483, 487 (1926),
35. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §104(a) (1940). See 3 COLLER, BANKRUPTCY
§64.402 (14th ed. 1941).
36. United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 427-9 (1941).
37. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Remund, 67 Sup. Ct. 891 (1947) (Farm
Credit Administration) ; United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423 (1941) (Federal Hous-
ing Administration) ; United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414 (1940) (Federal Hous-
ing Administration). However, a government corporation, being viewed as a separate
entity, has been denied the benefits of this priority. Sloan Shipyards Corp, v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 570 (1922). See Note, 47
CoL. L. REV. 485 (1947).
38. The Court is reluctant to read an exception into the statute even under these
circumstances. However, priority was denied to the government for loans made to rail-
roads after World War I, as in conflict with Congressional purpose to reestablish the
credit of the private railroads. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533
(C. C. A. 8th 1929), aff'd, 280 U. S. 478 (1930). See Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in
United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 433-40 (1941); Blair, m/,ra note I, at 6. A
possible solution of this anomaly, albeit of limited application, is the bill currently in-
troduced in Congress to amend REy. STAT. §3466 so as to place laborers' claims for wages
above the federal priority. H. R. No. 104, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
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ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL LAWS MARKS AREA
OPEN TO CONCURRENT STATE REGULATION*
IN its role as umpire to the federal system' the Supreme Court has, at least
in recent years, ruled that states may legislate concurrently with the federal
government unless there be a direct conflict with,2 or a preemption by,3 fed-
eral law.4 To determine conflict or preemption, not only have the terms and
history of federal statutes been considered, but increasing weight has been
given to the practice and opinions of the appropriate federal administrative
agencies.
In the recent companion cases of Rice z. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.5 and Rice
v. Chicago Board of Trade,0 the Court held the State of Illinois to be pre-
cluded from enforcing a major portion of its laws regulating the practices of
grain warehousemen because of parallel federal regulation. The cases arose
from an attempt by D. F. Rice & Co., independent Chicago grain dealers, to
get relief from allegedly monopolistic practices of the large Chicago ware-
houses. Having unsuccessfully petitioned the Chicago Board of Trade to alter
its rules so as to prevent the practices,1 Rice filed a complaint with the Illinois
* Rice v. Sante Fe Elevatore Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1947), and Rice v. Board of
Trade of City of Chicago, 67 Sup. Ct. 1160 (1947).
1. See, generally, Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. or Car. L Rnv.
27 (1942).
2. Illinois Nat Gas Co. v. Central IlL Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U. S. 493 (1942) ; Hill
v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945); compare Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 283 U. S.
188 (1933) (no conflict with federal Grain Futures Act) uith Clark v. Murphy, 142
Kan. 426, 49 P.2d 973 (1935) (same federal statute, state acts superseded).
3. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line LR., 272 U. S. 605 (1926) ; Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52 (1941).
4. From shortly after the Fourteenth Amenidment was adopted in 1263 until 1937
that Amendment was the chief weapon used by the Supreme Court to curb state legis-
lation. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) (San Francisco ordinance discrimi-
nating against Chinese laundries); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.
'418 (1890) (railroad rate-fixing statute); Lochner v. United States, 193 U. S. 45 (1905)
(hours of work of bakery employees); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262 (1932) (supervision of ice manufacturing in Oklahoma). In 1937, however, the
Court upheld a Washington minimum wage statute less than a year after it had invali-
dated a similar New York statute for lack of "due process." Compare West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) uith Morehead v. New York, 293 U. S. 587 (1936).
No Supreme Court decision since then has, so far as noted, employed the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down a state law except in the field of "civil rights."
That the concepts of preemption and conflict can reach far into the realm of state
legislation is evidenced by such cases as Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945),
55 YALF L. J. 421 (1946), and United States v. Appalachian Electrical Power Co., 311
U. S. 377 (1940).
5. 67 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1947).
6. 67 Sup. Ct 1160 (1947).
7. "In 1941 Rice petitioned the Board of Trade to secure revisions of some of its
rules, with a view of correcting some of the major abuses. Petition was filed by 125
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Commerce Commission against eleven warehousemen and the Board of Trade
charging several violations of Illinois law which the Commission was em-
powered to enforce.8 Seven of the warehousemen, licensed under the United
States Warehouse Act,9 and the Board of Trade, designated as a contract
market under the Commodity Exchange Act,10 commenced separate suits in a
federal district court to enjoin the state commission proceedings, claiming that
the United States had so preempted the field as to invalidate state regulation."1
In holding that federal law had to a large extent superseded state regulation
the Court apparently invoked a test far more realistic than that of the circuit
court. Evidence of congressional intent to exclude all state legislation had
members of the Board of Trade, but failed of adoption ...." Communication to YALE
LAW JOURNAL from Lee A. Freeman, of counsel for D. F. Rice & Co., Feb. 10, 1947.
8. Complaint filed July 28, 1944, with the Illinois Commerce Commission, Civil No,
32267. Rice charged chiefly the following violations of Illinois law by the warehouse-
men; (1) charging excessive rates, (2) discriminating against independent grain dealers,
(3) operating without a state license, (4) dealing in their own grain, and (5) failing to
secure Illinois Commerce Commission approval before issuing securities or making fi-
nancial transactions with other public utilities. Ibid. Violations are alleged of virtually
every provision of Illinois law regarding Warehouses which the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission is empowered to enforce. Illinois Public Utility Act, ILL. REv. STAT., c. 1112j, § 1
et seq. (1945) ; Illinois Grain Warehouse Act, id., c. 114, § 189 et seq. The state prohi-
bition against warehousemen dealing in their own grain has resulted from a judicial in-
terpretation of Section Thirteen of the Illinois Constitution. Hannah v. People, 198 1M1.
77, 64 N. E. 776 (1902) (statute permitting such dealing held unconstitutional).
The alleged violation by the Board of Trade is the only provision in Illinois law
which grants to the Commission authority over the Board. It requires Commission ap-
proval of all Board warehousing rules before they go into effect. ILL. RaV. STAT., c.
114, § 194b (1945).
9. 39 STAT. 486 (1916), as amended, 46 STAT. 1463 (1931), 7 U. S. C. §241 et seq.
(1940). The Warehouse Act applies only to those warehousemen who takd out a vol-
untary federal license. In Chicago, as in many of the principal markets, most large public
grain elevators are federally licensed. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL front De-
partment of Agriculture, Dec. 18, 1946. The Act's main purpose is to build the ware-
house receipt into a dependable and easily negotiable instrument. Its chief provisions call
for federal inspection of grain as to both grade and quantity and prohibit removal of
grain from a warehouse until receipts issued on it are returned and canceled. See, on the
importance of these two requirements, SHEPHERD, MARKETING FARm PRODUCTS 221-33
(1946). Illinois law differs from the Warehouse Act in three principal respects: (1) a
warehouseman need not cancel a receipt for grain before removing the grain, (2) a
warehouseman may not deal in his own grain, and (3) issuance of securities and financial
transactions with other public utilities require state approval. See note 8 supra.
10. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), as amended, 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 1 ct seq.
(1940). The House Committee on Agriculture, in reporting out the bill which became the
Commodity Exchange Act, said: "The fundamental purpose of the measure is to insure
fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges....." H. R. REP. No. 421,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). The Act is comprehensive, but grants no specific au-
thority over rules made by the contract markets, as does Illinois law. See note 8 supra.
11. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 156 F.2d
33 (C. C. A. 7th 1946). The district court held that state law had not been superseded
and denied injunctions.
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been found by the circuit court in the equivocal legislative history1- and
seemingly broad coverage13 of the Warehouse and Commodity Exchange
Acts. The Supreme Court, however, looked beyond the inconclusive statutory
language to the actual practice of the federal regulatory agency, here the De-
partment of Agriculture. In addition the Court appears to have relied heavily
on the view of state activities taken by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Such a dual test is not new in Supreme Court decisions. It was particularly
brought out by a pair of agricultural cases considering the Plant Quarantine
Act14 and the Cattle Contagious Disease Act,'5 which give the Secretary of
Agriculture substantially identical authority in their respective fields. With
no evidence of the Secretary's opinion at hand, but stressing that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture was handling such problems,10 the Court held that the
Plant Quarantine Act had superseded similar state legislation. In contrast, a
New York ban against the importation of diseased cattle was upheld where a
letter from the Secretary was produced which sanctioned the restriction im-
posed by the state.'7 Deference to the views of federal agencies has also
been marked in cases concerning labor relations,18 development of water
12. The court relied heavily, for instance, on the 1931 amendment to § 29 of the
United States Warehouse Act, which reads in part as follows: " . . the power, juris-
diction, and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this chapter
shall be exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as said
license remains in effect." 46 STAT. 1465 (1931), 7 U.S.C. §269 (1940). In the House
Report on the 1931 Amendment to § 29 it is said, "To make the law accomplish the real
purpose of Congress, it should be independent of any State legislation on the subject."
H. R. REp. No. 4, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1930). The Senate Report reads in part as
follows: "The amendment proposed to this section would make the Federal act inde-
pendent of State laws . . if it is decided to secure a license under the Federal act
then the warehouseman would be authorized to operate without regard to State acts and
be solely responsible to the Federal act." Siur. REP. No. 1775, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2
(1931). Though the last sentence quoted tends to support a theory that Congress in-
tended to preempt the field, any such implication is refuted by the first clause of § 29 of
the Act, which states that: "In the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture he is
authorized to cooperate with State officials charged with the enforcement of State laws
relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, graders, inspectors, samplers, or classi-
fiers... :' 46 STAT. 1465 (1931), 7 U.S.C. §269 (1940).
13. 156 F.2d at 40, 43 (C. C. A. 7th 1946). That such a test is presently in disfavor
is suggested by Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318
U. S. 1, 4 (1943), where the Supreme Court declined to consider either the extent of the
ICC's authority in the field or its power over the specific subject in upholding a state
regulation.
14. 37 STAT. 315 (1912), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 151 ct scq. (1940).
15. 23 STAT. 31 (1884), as amended, 32 STAT. 791 (1903), 21 U.S.C. § 111 ct scq.
(1940).
16. Oregon-Washington Railroad and Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926).
17. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, esp. 349 (1933).
18. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 539 (1945) (state could not require registration
of union agents in face of NLRB); Allen-Bradley Local v. Visconsin Empl. Rl. Bd.,
315 U. S. 740, 748 (1942) (order enjoining mass picketing upheld).
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power,1' licenses to do business,20 alien registration,21 and crop proration-
ing programs.2
The Court has underlined the issue of duplication vel not in other situa-
tions where there has been no expression by the executive-in the Cloverleaf
Butter case,23 and in cases considering state jurisdiction over telephone com-
panies,24 interstate railroads,2 and motor carriers.28
That the Supreme Court probably prefers to obtain an opinion by the execu-
tive was demonstrated in Parker v. Browns where a California crop control
plan was upheld despite provision in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act for identical federal control. At the request of the Court the United
States there filed a brief amicus curiae stating that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture had helped to draw up and had approved the state plan.28 The Secre-
tary's approval was stated to be a key factor in the decision.-'
The United States filed a brief amicus curiae in the Supreme Court in the
two present cases, arguing for preemption by the Warehouse Act,30 and spe-
cifically refraining from making the same argument for the Commodity Ex-
change Act.3 1 In addition, the Administrator of the Warehouse Act has
pointed out, though not to the Court, the failure of past attempts to cooperate
with state warehousing officials,3 2 while the Commodity Exchange Authority
has apparently had no such problem.33
19. First I6wa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 161 (1946) (state li-
cense to construct power project held unnecessary).
20. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 208-9 (1944) (state could re-
quire that federally licensed exporter obtain state license to do business).
21. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941) (federal alien registration held to
preclude state registration).
22. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 352 et seq. (1943) (California permitted to carry
out raisin prorationing program).
23. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942) (state inspection and
condemnation of butter ingredients held invalid).
'24. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Comm'n, 297 U, S. 471
(1936) (Nebraska permitted to set telephone depredation rates).
25. Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U S, 1
(1943) (Illinois order that all freight trains carry cabooses upheld).
26. H. P. Welch Co.'v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939) (state regulation of
hours of truck drivers valid until ICC took affirmative action).
27. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
28. Id. at 356-7.
29. "We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would follow if
the state program had not been adopted with the collaboration of officials of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and aided by loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation recom-
mended by the Secretary of Argiculture." Id. at 358-9.
30. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 18 ct seq.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from Department of Agriculture, Dee. 18,
1946.
33. "The question of cooperation between the Commodity Exchange Authority and
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Both for the warehousemen and the Board of Trade the amzcus brief, pre-
sumably representing the opinion of the Secretary of Agricultureas fore-
shadowed the final result. The Government divided the questions in the
Elevator case into the regulation of grain storage, e.g., rates, grain stand-
ards, warehouse receipts, and the regulation of warehousing finance, e.g., is-
suance of securities, contracts with affiliates and other public utilities. As to
grain storage the Government argued strongly that state regulation should be
precluded, 36 pointing to an inevitable duplication in practice, as well as to Sec-
tion 29 of the federal Warehouse Act, which, in an unusual provision, states
that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture is exclusiveS In regard
to warehousing finance the Government's brief confessed doubt, although it
did argue against state supervision.3 8
The Court made a similar division of warehouse activities and upheld the
arguments of the Government on grain storage.m9 Emphasizing that the Secre-
tary of Agriculture had never attempted financial regulation of warehouses,
the Court allowed the Illinois Commerce Commission to take jurisdiction over
this phase of warehouse activities.4 0
In the Board of Trade case, where the state sought only to review the
Board's rules as to warehousing practices in the face of federal regulation de-
signed principally to prevent fraudulent activities on the exchange itself,4 1 the
Court, with the Government 42 could see no necessary incompatibility between
state and federal action. The Court, in fact, perceived separate functions be-
ing served by the dual regulation and unanimously upheld the trial court's re-
fusal of injunctive relief.43
Effective solution of national problems under a dual form of government,
where legislative adjustment frequently lags behind administrative actuality,
demands that settlement of the boundaries between state and federal authority
be based more on administrative practice and feasibility than on the niceties of
statutory interpretation. Application of a criterion so vague as the all-inclusive
language of a statute to strike down state legislation which in practice supple-
State regulatory bodies has never arisen." Communication to YALE- LAv JoumanAL from
Department of Agriculture, Feb. 12, 1947.
34. It would seem fair to assume that, though the brief is signed by the Solicitor
General, it may be accepted as the opinion of the Secretary of Agriculture, who is
charged with enforcement of both the Warehouse Act and the Commodity Exchange Act.
Briefs were apparently so accepted in the cases cited note 18 supra.
35. Brief for the United States as Amicsas Curiae, pp. 42-69.
36. Id. at 42-61.
37. See note 12 supra.
38. Brief for United States as Atmicus Curiae, pp. 63-9.
39. 67 Sup. Ct. 1149-55 (1947).
40. Id. at 1155-6.
41. See notes 8 and 10 supra.
42. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 14.
43. 67 Sup. Ct. 1164 (1947).
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ments federal regulation can scarcely serve the best interests of either govern-
ment. On the other hand, to give weight to the recommendations of the fed-
eral executive as to whether state laws can stand without impairing or dupli-
cating federal action should both increase administrative efficiency and mini-
mize the area of federal-state conflict.
"ADULTS ONLY" PROVISIONS IN LEASES*
THE contractual obligations embodied in the residential lease,' which gov-
erns the living arrangements of more than half the population of the United
States,2 are theoretically the product of lessor-lessee negotiation on a basis of
relative equality. But the real inequality of bargaining position of tenants
leasing low-cost apartments and multiple dwelling houses is demonstrated by
the increasing prevalence of "standardized" leases,3 in many cases virtual
"contracts of adhesion." 4 Although the current housing shortage has sharply
accentuated existing inequalities, few legislative' or judicial" limitations on
* Lamont Building Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N. E.2d 447 (1946).
1. For the usual terms and conditions of leases, see PEREGo, APARTMENT HOUSE
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 63-7 (1934) and'RoSAHN AND GOLDFELD, HOUSING MAN-
AGEMENT 44-54 (1937).
2. U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 16Tn CENSUS OF THE U.S.: 2 HOUSING Pt. I, 7-8(1940). The 1940 census indicated a percentage of 58.9 of the population living in non-
farm rental housing, as compared with 54.0 in 1930. See COLEAN, AMErICAN HousiNG
227 (1944). The Census Bureau study of June 1946 revealed that 47% of all veterans
seeking housing desired rental housing, while real estate specialists have recently sug-
gested a figure as high as 85%. In view of the high cost of sales housing and the effects
of rising living costs on the buyer's ability to finance long term investment, a prevailing
upward trend in rental housing percentages is highly probable. See Wheildon, National
Housing Emergency, 1946-1947, 2 EDITORIAL RzsEARci REPORTS 873 (1946).
3. "The provisions embodied in [such] leases . . . constitute a comprehensive scheme
of landlord immunity, together with an extensive enumeration of the tenant's duties ...
[which] even the informed tenant [is forced] to accept . . . in order to obtain accom-
modations." Note, Landlord and Tenant After OPA, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 249 (1947).
4. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 COL. L. REv. 629 (1943).
5. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 25 (1942), as amended, 50
U.S.C. APP. §902(b) (Supp. 1945). "Maximum Rent Rejulations issued by the Admin-
istrator also sharply limit the power of landlords to terminate leases. OPA Rent Regu-
lation for Housing §1388.1181(b), 10 FED. REG. 3441 (1945). However, the federal regula-
tions do not abrogate local laws, but merely place certain legal remedies generally available
to landlords in abeyance for the duration of such controls unless otherwise authorized by
the administrator.
Power of attorney provisions, by Which tenants authorize a confession of judgment
and waiver of process and trial by jury, have been prohibited in some states as violative
of public policy. Ky. REv. STAT. §372.140 (1946); MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 231, §13A
(1933) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §1545 (1942). Exculpatory clauses, equally advantageous to
landlords, have been abrogated in New York. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw §234.
6. See Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (App. D.C. 1946) (exculpatory clause strictly
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landlord power have thus far been imposed. Lamont Building Co. v. Court,
in which the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a lease provision limiting occupancy
to adults only, indicates that freedom of contract on a "take it or leave it"
basis is still the prevailing rule.
In the Lamont case, plaintiff's agent rented an apartment to the defendant,
stating that occupancy in the building was restricted to adults,8 although, un-
known to the agent, the defendant's wife was pregnant at the time. When a
child was born si:x months later, the landlord notified defendant to arrange for
occupancy by adults only or to vacate. Upon defendant's failure to comply,
an eviction action was brought for the alleged violation of a substantial obli-
gation of the tenancy.9 Defendant's verdict in the trial court was affirmed by
the intermediate appellate court,'0 which held the "adults only" provision void
as against public policy when applied to children born during the tenancy.
With apparent reluctance, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Emphasiz-
ing the importance of protecting property rights and freedom of contract as
against a "vague and uncertain" public policy, the court held the "adults only"
provision to be a proper subject of "voluntary" agreement and not violative
of any established interest of society.
The holding seems to ignore the inevitable present consequences of "adults
only" provisions. Their immediate effect is to deny many tenants with chil-
dren access to the only adequate housing within reach of a limited income,"
thereby inducing a further overcrowding of sub-standard facilities'- and a
construed against the landlord, with the suggestion that such a provision might be in-
valid on grounds of public policy as too easy to obtain during the housing shortage;
Walker & Dunlop, Inc. v. Gladden, 47 ._2d 510 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1946) (adopting
a similar view).
7. 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N. E2d 447 (1946).
8. While it does not appear whether a written lease was employed, the stipulations
against occupancy by children were apparently entirely oral. The first month's rental
receipt was over-stamped "Specific rental rule: No pets-adults only."
9. OPA regulations provide that a landlord may evict a lessee who ... has vio-
lated a substantial obligation of his tenancy, other than an obligation to pay rent.....
OPA Rent Regulation for Housing §1388.1181(b) (3), 10 FED. RFa. 3441 (1945). How-
ever, in order for the landlord to obtain an eviction for such violation, the obligation must
be of a contractual nature, "inherent in the nature of the tenancy." Kirschbaum v. Mobley,
26 Ohio Ops. 333, 336 (1943).
10. 45 Ohio L. Abs. 250, 66 N. E2d 552 (Ohio App. 1946), 59 HAnv. L. RE. 1171.
11. Of the total number of families living in rental housing, less than one fourth are
able to pay more than a $40 monthly rent. Hearings before Committee on Banking and
Cirrenwy on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., tables following 538 (1945).
12. Almost 30% of the families in urban areas, as shown by the 1940 census, are now
living in housing so sub-standard as to be a threat to their health and welfare. NA'L.
Comm ox Social. LEaisLATuRu OF THE NATioNAL L.mwYms' GuInD, A Pos-AlA Low
RENT HouSIXG PRooRAm 3 (1945). In 1940, appprodmately one fourth of all rental
housing needed major repairs or lacked running water and plumbing. Hcarings before
Comnttee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., tables following
538 (1945). See also WooD, IxTRooucno. To HOUsiNG FAcrs AD PRmCIPLES 10, 36, 146-9
(1939).
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further doubling up of families."3 As recognized by the press, 14 such lease
restrictions only serve to aggravate an already malignant housing situation, to
which much of the increase in juvenile delinquency and disease, 1 and degen-
eration of the family institution10 has been attributed. Nor can the caveat of
the intermediate Ohio court1 be ignored: not only will many tenants of pro-
creative age living under "adults only" agreements refrain, if possible, from
having children, but others, faced with the prospect of eviction, might also
resort to abortion of an unplanned child. Thus, a realistic analysis of the im-
pact of these, provisions during the housing shortage indicates a tendency to
thwart the desire for children and to impede the normal development of fam-
ily life. Far from being "vague and uncertain," a policy of protecting and
encouraging the family institution has been affirmatively expressed by legis-
latures, and in other contexts scrupulously adhered to by courts.
While only a few state statutes specifically prohibit "adults only" restric-
tions18 there is inherent in the state and federal housing acts' passed in recent
13. See 91 CONG. REc. 9638 (1945) ; 91 CONG. RzE. A5540 (1945) ; Hearings before
Subcommittee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 4761, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 160 (1946).
As of December 31, 1946, over three million families were reported living "doubled up"
with their relatives or other families. Hearings before Conznmittee on Banking and Cur-
rency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 320, tables following 538 (1945). Instances of
two or three families living in one apartment are common throughout the country, while
extreme cases of from nine to seventeen persons living in a two or three room apartment
have been reported. See DAVIES, FUNDAmENTALS OF HOUSING STUDY 55 (1938) ; WOOD,
INTRODUCTION TO HOUSING FACTs AND PRINCIPLES 38 (1939).
14. See Are Children Peoplef, N. Y. Times, March 6, 1947, p. 24, col. 3; Roosevelt,
My Day (Syndicated column) Dec. 5, 1946 (severely criticizing the Ohio courts decision
in the Lamont case as a failure to recognize the urgency of the current housing situation).
15. Hearintgs before Conmittee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 319, 431 (1945) ; Britten, New Light on the Relationship of Housing to Health, 32
AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 193 (1942) ; DAvIES, op. cit. sipra note 13, at 79-84, 97-9; POST,
THE CHALLENGE OF HOUSING 50 (1938) ; WOOD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 42, 54 (1939).
16. Hearings before Subcommittee on Banking and Currency on HjR. 4761, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1946) ; DAviEs, op. cit. mtpra note 13, at 106. "Marital stresses and
family problems have arisen through emotional disturbances and maladjustments which
can be traced directly to inadequate and crowded housing ... (and) the need of moving
ifi with in-laws." N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 7, 1947, p. 28, col. 1 (citing crowded hous-
ing as the chief cause of the present high divorce rate in the United States).
17. Lamont Building Co. v. Court, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 250, 254, 66 N. E.2d 552, 554
(1946).
18. Aniz. CODE ANN. §43-1006 (1940) ; REv. CODE OF DELAWARE §5067 (Star, 1936)
ILL. STAT. ANN., C. 80, §37 (Smith-Hurd, 1935) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §144-2 (1939);
N. Y. PENAL LAw §2041. Such statutes declare the refusal to rent or the termination of
existing tenancies because of children in the lessee's family to be unlawful as against
public policy. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor, resulting in fine or imprison-
ment.
19. See Housing for Distressed Families of Servicemen and Veterans, 59 STAT. 260,
42 U.S.C. § 1571 (Supp. 1945) ; Veterans Emergency Housing Program, 60 STA. 207,
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1821 (Supp. 1946); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 67 12, §2 (Smith-Hurd,
Supp. 1946); N. Y. PUBLIC HOUSING LAw § 200; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, §§ 1701-2
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years a legislative recognition of the relation of adequate housing to the
growth and development of the family. In hearings preceding federal legis-
lation, repeated emphasis was placed upon the necessity of protecting the se-
curity of the home by eliminating the social and economic pressures, attrib-
utable to inadequate housing, which encourage divorce and postponement of
propagation.20 The desirability of providing opportunity for the normal de-
velopment of children was also stressed,2 ' with the result that most Federal
Housing Authorities have pursued a policy of extending preferential treat-
ment in the selection of tenants to families with children.2 The declarations
of policy found in the National Housing Acts have, in general, been adopted
by the states in statutes coordinated with the federal legislationY2
judicial recognition of the importance of preserving the family institution
is found in cases involving acts and agreements in derogation of marriage and
the marital functions.2 4 Property and contract rights have frequently been
"impaired" in voiding conditions and covenants in deeds and contracts which
tend to restrain or discourage marriage or to encourage the future separa-
tion of husband and wife.-' Similar considerations have prompted courts to
strike down agreements between husband and wife to refrain from sex rela-
(Purdon, Supp. 1946). See also National Housing Act, 48 STar. 1246 (1934), as
amended 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1940, Supp. 1945) ; H. R. REP. No. 150, 79th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1946).
20. Hearings before Comnmittee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 771, 777, 1111, 1119 (1945).
21. Id. at 320, 322, 777, 1110, 1111, 1119 (1945) ; Hearings before Subcomtitce on
Banking ad Currency on H. R. 4761, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 243 (1946) ; 91 Co:re. Rc
A3958 (1945).
22. Communication to the YAE LAw JounaAL from the Federal Housing Authority,
New Haven, Conn., April 15, 1946. A similar policy in the selection of tenants for public
housing is found in the British Housing Act of 1936, 26 GEo. V & 1 Ezw. VIII, c. 51,
§85(2). HILL, THE ComTLE'rE LAw OF HoUsNG 203 (1938). See also British Defense
Program anid Local Government, 69 PuB. ADm. SEav. 41 (1940).
23. By 1940, thirty-nine states had enacted housing legislation, integrated with the
National Housing Acts, creating state housing authorities. The National Housing Act of
1937 sets forth a general policy of remedying "the unsafe and insanitary housing con-
ditions and the acute shortage of decent, sale, and sanitary dwellings for families of low
income... injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the Nation."
50 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. §1401 (1940).
24. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAnv. L. Rsv. 1, 7, 21 (1943).
25. Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E.2d 658 (1939); Low v. Peers, 4
Burr. 2225, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (Ex%. 1770) ; Note, 122 A. L. R. 7 (1939) and cases therein
collected.
26. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909); Barngrover v. Pettigrew,
128 Iowa 533, 104 N. V. 904 (1905) ; Cartwright v. Cartwright, 3 De G. I. and G. 932
(Ch. 1853); HALSBUEY, LAws OF EXGLAND 157 (Hailsham Ed. 1932). See Fender v.
Mildmay, 3 All Eng. 402, 415 (H. L 1937), in v.hich Lord Thankerton expressed the
idea that "such agreements negative the consortium %itae, which is intended ... to con-
serve and further the interests of the children... ." But cf. Farnum v. Bartlett 52 Me.
570 (1864).
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tions,2 7 and to recognize the refusal of sex relations28 or the continued use of
contraceptives' as a ground for divorce or annulment. While it may be ar-
gued, as did the Ohio court,3 0 that "adults only" provisions do not in them-
selves constitute a direct contractual restraint on propagation or marriage,
their practical effect would seem to place them in the same disfavored cate-
gory. 1
By placing these lease terms in their social and economic perspective, there-
fore, ample basis can be found upon which to declare them void as contrary to
public policy. While a forthright decision to this effect would perhaps be the
most facile solution to the problem, many courts are reluctant to pre-commit
themselves on a recurring issue, preferring instead to deal with each fact sit-
uation as it arises. Were this position to be adopted in viewing "adults only"
provisions, effective means of minimizing their undesirable consequences
would still be available. As suggested by the dissent in the Lainont case,3 2 it
may often be a question of fact for determination by the jury whether the
"adults only" restriction is merely a rental policy of favoring childless tenants
or whether it is actually a part of the rental agreement ;33 and in the latter
case, whether the birth of a child constitutes a "violation of a substantial ob-
ligation of the tenancy" within the meaning of OPA regulations. 4  More-
over, in those cases where an agreement against occupancy by children has
27. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 150 N. E. 605 (1926); Gregg v. Gregg, 133
Misc. 109, 231 N. Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Miller v. Miller, 132 Misc. 121, 228
N. Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §587 (1932).
28. Raymond v. Raymond, 79 At. 430 (N. J. Ch. 1909) ; Stein v. Stein, 5 Colo. 55
(1879) ; Note, 10 CoRe. L. Q. 374 (1925). But cf. Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N. E. 1058
(1891).
29. Cowen v. Cowen, 2 All Eng. 197 (C. A. 1945), 55 YALE L. J. 596 (1946);
Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N. J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (Ch. 1942), 55 HAv. L, Rav. 1044.
But cf. Wendel v. Wendel, 30 Hun 447, 52 N. Y. Supp. 72 (2d Dep't 1898); Taylor v.
Taylor, 142 Pa. Super. 441, 16 A.2d 651 (1940).
30. Lamont Building Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 184, 70 N. E2d 447, 448 (1946).
The court argued that the landlord was not compelling the tenant to covenant against
having children, but was only requiring that the tenant should not bring any children he
might have in the future on to the leased premises. Such a construction would, of course,
tend to separate children from their parents until adequate accommodations could be se-
cured.
31. For an English view of "Adults Only" provisions, see Note, 87 SOL 3. 368 (1943).
32. Lamont Building Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 186, 70 N. E.2d 447, 450 (1946).
33. In actual practice, "adults only" restrictions are seldom included in the specific
terms and conditions of the lease, whether the lease be oral or written. As indicated in
the Lamont case, any agreement relating to occupancy by children is usually arrived at
informally during the pre-lease negotiations between the landlord and the prospective
lessee. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURxAL, from the New Haven Real Estate
Board, April 14, 1947.
34. See note 9 supra. In the Lamont case, the unilateral action of the landlord in
stamping a rental rule across the face of the rental receipt could hardly be called a "con-
tracting" between the parties; the materiality of the obligation, therefore, in the absence
of express language, seemed properly a question for the jury.
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dearly been made, there may often be no forfeiture provided for the breach
of this particular covenant or condition. Since doubtful cases are generally
construed against the party seeking to invoke a forfeiture,-s the landlord
might be limited to an action for nominal damages and the tenant remain in
possession.3 6 The parol evidence rule may also be used to good advantage in
avoiding a termination of the lease,37 and even in those cases where a written
covenant or condition provides for forfeiture, non-performance may still be
excused under the doctrines of "changed conditions" 35 or "impossibility of
performance." 39 In the Lanwnt case, for example, there was evidence of
other children living in the same building, which could be regarded as a ma-
35. Murphy v. Traynor, 110 Colo. 465, 135 P2d 230 (1943) ; Steinberg Y. Fine, 225
Mich. 281, 196 N.W. 367 (1923); Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 2,0 Pac. 359
(1927); see 2 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLOmR AND TE-,NAN-r, 1363-6 (1912) and cases
therein collected; see TAYLOR, LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT , 4S9 (9th d. 1904) and
cases there cited.
36. See 2 TIFFAN.Y, op. cit. supra note 35, at 1358-64.
37. Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 46 Wash. 6S6, 91 Pac. 186 (1907) ; see 2 TrxA.;Y,
op. cit. supra note 35, at 1363 and cases therein cited. It may be difficult to predict
whether an oral agreement will be considered collateral to a written lease or a variation
of the written terms. However, it is generally held that, to be collateral, the promise or
agreement must relate to a subject distinct from that to which the written lease applies,
and that the reservation of an option to terminate a written lease can not rest upon an
oral contemporaneous agreement.
38. Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 Ill. 621, 99 N. E. 617 (1912); Jackson v. Stevenson,
156 fass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892) ; see 2 TIFFA., TmE LAw OF Rz Pr.or 1456
(1920); Goldstein, Restrictions on Use of Land, 54 HARv. L. RE%. 266 (1940). While the
doctrine of changed conditions seems to be peculiarly a property concept, with reference
to restrictive covenants in deeds, there seems to be little reason why the underlying prin-
ciples would not be equally applicable to restrictive covenants in leases.
Much of the difficulty which the courts have encountered in construing covenants and
conditions in leases has arisen out of the confusion over the conceptual nature of the
lease. Under the property concept, the lease itself, as distinguished from a contract to
lease, is regarded as a conveyance of an "estate in land," a view which seems wholly
inappropriate as applied to apartment leases. Some courts, however, have discarded the
property view for the "contract" theory, designating the lease as a bi-lateral contract
which becomes primarily executory as to the lessee upon signing by the lessor. See
Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F2d 724 (C. C. A. 8th 1941), cert. denicd 314 U.S. 639
(1941) ; see also JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS oN LANDLORD AND TENA- 13 (1941) ;
Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 TEx. L. REv. 47 (1937) ;
3 lWHLISTON, CoNmcrs §890 (1936).
39. Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Association, 92 Conn. 621, 103 AtL. 833 (1918) ; see
2 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORDn A TENANT 1409-10 (1912) ; A:.So,., CON;mAcrs
§376 (Corbin's ed. 1930); 6 WILLISrON, Coxrnr4crs §1935(3) (1938). The equity relief
against forfeiture on grounds of "inevitable accident" under the property concept of
leases would appear to be governed by principles similar to the doctrine of "impossibil-
ity" under contract law, resting upon "fortuitous circumstances beyond the control and
contemplation of the promisor." See RESTATEmxT, CoNTcrs §454 (1932), stating as
grounds for relief not only strict impossibility, but also "impracticability because of e-x-
treme and unreasonable difficulty." See also Page, The Delopment of the Doctrine
of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REv. 5S9 (1920).
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terial change in conditions. And were the wife not pregnant at the time of
leasing, it might well be said that performance of the "no-children" covenant
or condition had been rendered impossible by fortuitous circumstances beyond
the control of the tenant.
Judicial intervention in itself, however, may not be sufficient. While courts
can avoid or minimize the undesirable social effects of "no-children" restric-
tions as they arise in forfeiture and eviction cases, they have no means of
taking action against the operation of such restrictions as conditions prece-
dent to leasing. Although the paucity of cases arising under the few statutes
designed directly to meet this latter problem4" would imply some means of
circumvention, 41 nevertheless, if correlated with adequate publicity and strict
enforcement whenever possible, the statutes would add a moral factor per-
suasive on most of the law-abiding public. Furthermore, in providing a defi-
nitive legislative policy for courts to follow and enforce, a recurrence of the
results of the Laniont decision would be avoided. 42 Even in the absence of
legislation, however, courts should recognize the far reaching social implica-
tions of "adults only" provisions and refuse to grant them judicial sanction.4 a
STATE REGULATION OF PILOTAGE: CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF NEPOTIC APPRENTICESHIP REQUIREMENT'*
THE Supreme Court, as arbiter of the conflict between individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and state police power, has shown a salutary
deference to state and municipal regulation of callings and professions.1 But
40. See note 18 supra.
41. Since the enactment of the Arizona statute in 1921, not one case has yet arisen.
Communication to the YALE LAv JouRNAL from the Attorney General of Arizona, July
22, 1946. The oldest of the statutes, enacted in Illinois in 1909, records one case: People
v. Metcoff, 392 Ill. 418, 64 N. E. 2d 867 (1946) (dismissed for incompetent proof). It
would seem reasonable to conclude that the lessees are often unaware of their statutory
rights, and that the statute is circumvented by the landlord's refusal to disclose the rea-
sons for non-rental.
42. Many landlords have endeavored to obtain the results of "adults only" provisions
by the use of "restricted occupancy" clauses which terminate the lease upon occupancy
by more than two "persons." Where such clauses are clearly an effort to evade the
statute, the courts should have little difficulty in piercing the subterfuge and refusing to
enforce them.
43. ". . . freedom of contract must mean different things for different types of
contracts . . . (our concepts) must change with the social importance of the type of
contract and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized con-
tract." Kessler, supra note 4, at 642.
*Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 67 Sup. Ct. 910 (1947).
1. Where there is a rational justification for the legislation and the means of regu-
lation are reasonably related to the end sought, the Court has upheld such action.
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its recent 5-4 decision in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comnzissioncr, -
upholding a Louisiana system of pilotage regulation which sanctions nepotism
in the selection of river port pilots, may represent an undesirable extension of
this policy.3
Pilotage, the vocation of guiding vessels within ports and through inland
waterways, is a clannish profession4 which because of its great importance to
commerce has long been subject to governmental regulation.; Limited federal
regulation 6 has been supplanted by extensive state systems,7 some of which
Cigarette Vendors: Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900). Dentists: Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Ex-aminers, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) ; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S.
425 (1926); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923). Employment Agenees: Brazee v.
Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916). Grain Brokers: Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S.
1 (1923). Healers by Mental Suggestion: Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917). Insur-
ance Agents: La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919). Laundries: Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (185). Optornetrits':
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917).
Osteopaths: Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 2B3
(1912). Physicians: Mo. ex rel. Hurwitz v. North et al., 271 U.S. 40 (1926) ; Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); Reetz v. Michigan, 183 U.S. 505 (1903); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). Private Detectives: Lehoa v. Atlanta, 242
U.S. 53 (1916). Public Accountants: Lehmann v. Board of Accountancy, 263 U.S.
394 (1923). Public Weighers of Grain: Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 243 U.S. 365
(1919). Real Estate Brokers: Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922).
On the other hand, the Court has protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
right to equal protection of the laws, Yick Wo v. Hoplds, 118 U.S. 356 (1S6) and the
right to work, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
2. 67 Sup. Ct. 910 (1947). Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. Mr.
Justice Rutledge, with whom were Messrs. Justices Reed, Douglas, and Murphy, dis-
sented.
3. But it should be noted that the court was careful to limit its decision to pilotage
alone. 67 Sup. Ct. 910, 916 (1947).
4. See, e.g., Mobile Bar Pilots Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97
F. 2d 695, 697 (C.C.A. 5th 1933) ; KANE, DEEP DELTA Couxray, c. 10 (1944) ; Kalshoven,
Ri~ver Royalty, 219 SATuRDAY EVEMNG POST 26 (1946).
5. As early as the fourteenth century, England had pilot guilds (later royal corpora-
tions) which provided bodies of licensed pilots. PODTAGE n; THE U.S., Special Agents
Series, Department of Commerce, p. 8, (1917).
6. When the United States Constitution was adopted, each state had its owm system
of regulation. By the Act of August 7, 1789, Rnv. STAT. § 4235, (1875) Congress indicated
its intention not to supplant these systems, although under the commerce clause (U.S.
CoNsT. Art 8) it had been given that power. Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S.
187 (1912). The states, however, are now excluded from regulation of pilots engaged in
coastwise shipping. Rnv. STAT. §§ 4401, 4444 (1875), 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (1940).
7. State action in the pilotage sphere has been consistently upheld by the Supreme
Court. Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912); Olsen v. Smith, 195
U.S. 332 (1904) ; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572 (180) ; Ex pare McNiel, 13 Wall.
236 (U.S. 1871) ; Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
State courts also have uniformly upheld the regulatory systems. State cx ret. Biscayne
19471 1277
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
require long apprenticeships8 and most of which do not explicitly prohibit
nepotism.9
The Louisiana law10 follows the general pattern. It establishes a State Board
of Pilotage Commissioners consisting of three licensed pilots" which is au-
thorized to limit the number of pilots and select pilots according to its own
rules. 12 Applicants must have served a six months apprenticeship under a
state-licensed pilot,13 but the Board is given no powers over the selection of
apprentices.14 In practice, only persons selected by the statutorily-authorized
Crescent River Port Pilots Association", can become apprentices, and this
Bay Stevedoring Co. v. Turner, 143 Fla. 424, 196 So. 816 (1940); Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Commissioners, 209 La. 737, 25 So.2d 527 (1946) ; Caples v. MeNaught,
147 Ore. 72, 31 P.2d 789 (1934); Ring v. Patterson, 137 Ore. 234, 1 P. 2d 1105 (1931) ;
State ex rel. Sater v. Board of Pilotage Commissioners, 198 Wash. 695, 90 P.2d 238
(1939).
8. Five years (Maryland, Virginia) ; four years (Alabama, Delaware, Florida, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania). For other state requirements, see: Alabama, A. CoDE, tit. 38,
c. 2, § 57 (1940) ; Connecticut, CONN. Rnv. STAT., tit. 32, c. 182, § 3027 (1930) ; Delaware,
DEt.. REv. CODE, c. 35, § 1067 (1935) ; Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN., c. 310.04 (1943) ; Georgia,
G- CODE ANN., tit. 80, § 103 (Supp. 1945) ; Louisiana, LA. GEr. STAT., tit. 59, §§ 9154-63
(Dart, Supp.) ; Maine, ME. REv. STAT., c. 87, § 1 (1944); Maryland, MD. ANN. CoDE,
Art. 74, § 6 (Flack 1939) ; Massachusetts, MASS. LAW ANN., C. 103, § 3 (1932) ; Mississippi,
Miss. CoDE ANN., c. 2, § 7549 (1942) ; New Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, e. 8:11
(1938) ; New York, N. Y. NAVIGATioN LAW § 17; North Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT,, Div.
XI, c. 76-4 (1943) ; Oregon, ORE. ComP. LAws tit., 105, c. 2, § 217 (1940) ; Pennsylvania,
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 55, c. 2, § 44 (Pardon, 1930) ; South Carolina, S. C. CODE, c. 141, § 6688
(1942) ; Texas, Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN., tit. 128, c. 10, § 8266 (Vernon, 1937) ; Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN., c. 142, §3615 (1942) ; Washington, WAsH. REVy. STAT. ANN., c. 11, §§ 9856,
9871-9878 (Remington, 1932).
9. Only six states have general anti-nepotism laws: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§116.10, 116.11 (1943) ; Idaho, IDAnO CODE ANN. §57-701 (1932) ; Missouri, Mo. CONST.
Art. XIV, § 13; Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-108 (1943) ; Nevada, Nrv. Com'i. LAws
§4851 (Supp. 1941); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE, tit. 8, Art. 432-438 (Vernon, 1938).
10. Act 54 (1908) as amended by Act 148 (1914), Act 9 (1918), and Act 134 (1942).
LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 59, §§ 9154-63 (Dart, 1939).
11. LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 59, § 9154 (Dart, 1939).
12. The Board recommends to the Governor those it deems qualified, but his re-
.quired approval appears to be a mere formality. Lt. GEN. STAT., tit. 59. § 9157 (Dart,
1939).
13. The law does not in terms require that. the apprenticeship be served under an in-
cumbent pilot, but the state supreme court has so construed it by the instant decision.
209 La. 737, 25 So.2d 527 (1946).
14. Id. at 758, 25 So.2d at 533.
15. Although §9159 of LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 59 (Dart, 1939) authorizes the forma-
tion of the Association, it does not prescribe any duties therefor. However, since all
state-licensed pilots engaged in pilotage on the Mississippi River between New Orleans
and the Mississippi Delta (including the three members of the Board) belong to the
Association, it is impossible to become an apprentice without Association approval. Pilots
*handling vessels through the Delta to the ocean have their own association and are sep-
arately regulated. LA. GEN. STAT. §§9141, 9146-53 (Dart, 1939).
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group has consistently limited selection to its members' relatives and friends.' 0
A 1942 amendment17 extended the monopoly of state-licensed pilots to include
pilotage of foreign vessels within the port of New Orleans, which had been
the major portion of the business of plaintiffs, federally licensed pilots.18 Al-
though plaintiffs had more than fifteen years pilotage experience in that area,
the Board refused to consider their applications for state licenses because they
had not served the required six months apprenticeship.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion which avoided the real
issues,19 upheld the state statute against plaintiffs' charge of violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court, in sustaining the Louisiana court's decision, -3 admitted that
the Louisiana system was one of nepotism, but nevertheless upheld the stat-
utes as not "unrelated" to the concededly proper objective of ensuring a safe
and efficient pilotage system.21
Deference to state legislation in the area of economic regulation - has not
caused the Court in previous cases to slight its function as the ultimate guard-
ian of individual freedom in the fields of civil rights and civil liberties. - The
right to engage in one's chosen profession, free from state-imposed unreason-
16. 67 Sup. Ct 910, 912 (1947).
17. Acts 1942, No. 134, LA. Gzx. STAT., tit. 59, §§9155, 9160 (Dart, 1939).
18. For the applicable federal licensing statute, see note 6 stura.
19. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 209 La. 737, 25 So2d 527
(1946). The court interpreted plaintiffs' complaint as an attack upon the power of the
state to regulate pilotage rather than upon the method, and rested its decision on Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). There, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of similar Texas statutes. The Olsen case is, however, distinguishable,
since in Petterson v. Board, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 33, 57 S. IV. 1002 (1900), on which the
Texas court relied in ruling on the 01n case, 6S S. V. 320 (1902), the apprenticeship
provision of the Tex-as statute had been construed as directory only. The Louisiana pro-
vision is mandatory.
20. 67 Sup. Ct. 910 (1947). The Court considered as an important factor that the
case tested the power of a state to select its own officers and agents. But the decision
cannot be justified on this ground. As pointed out by the dissent in the Kolcls case, a
state cannot legally sanction unconstitutional discriminatory practices in any profession
simply by declaring its members to be state officers. Id. at 917 (1947). Furthermore, it
should be noted that pilots are state officers in Louisiana only by judicial construction.
Levine v. Mlichel, 35 La. Ann. Rep. 1121, 1124 (183) ; Louisiana v. Follett, 33 La. Ann.
Rep. 228, 230 (1881) ; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. Rep. 7, 8 (1859). But see Hous-
ton Pilots v. Goodwin, 178 S. W.2d 308, 312 (Ten. Civ. App. 1944).
21. 67 Sup. Ct 910, 916.
22. Terminal R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) ; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 1&9 (1941) ;
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 593 (1940); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm
Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938). But cf. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). And see cases cited note 1 stpra.
23. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 533 (1945);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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able and discriminatory training requirements, would seem an essential ele-
ment of such freedom. It is, therefore, surprising that the Court rejected two
lines of legal argument which could have been used to invalidate the Louisiana
system of pilotage regulation.
First, it can be argued that the mandatory apprenticeship requirement is
itself unconstitutional. The usual rule is that state regulation of a profession
is constitutional wherever the means chosen are reasonably related to the ends
sought.24 Since there would seem to be no rational basis for requiring fed-
erally-licensed pilots of fifteen years experience in the same area to undergo a
six months apprenticeship, such a requirement would appear to constitute a
deprivation of the liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Second, it can be contended that any state-sanctioned system of selection
which makes family relationship the all-important criterion constitutes a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of that same amendment. Certainly this is
so where the connection between nepotism and increased safety and efficiency
is of the tenuous kind found here.25 And there are analogous cases which
could support such a doctrine. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 the Court invali-
dated a system of licensing of laundrymen, when applied so as to discriminate
on the basis of nationality ;27 discrimination based on blood relationship is not
24. In Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914), the Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute providing that only those who had occupied certain specified positions might be-
come railroad conductors, saying: ". . . there is no authority for the proposition that
conditions may be imposed by statute which will admit some who are competent and
arbitrarily exclude others who are equally competent. ... None of the cases sustains the
proposition that, under the power to secure the public safety, a privileged class can be
created and be then given a monopoly of the right to work in a special or favored po-
sition." Id. at 638. Cf. Williams v. Molther, 198 Fed. 460, 464 (C. C. A. 2d 1912) in
which a Federal court upheld any applicant's right to an examination for a federal
pilot's license, saying: "While no citizen has the inherent right to a pilot's license, every
citizen has a right to be examined for it. The local inspectors are to determine the ap-
plicant's qualifications. They may hold in any case that he has not had sufficient deck
experience. That, however, is quite different from refusing him an examination for this
reason. .. One applicant might be qualified after one year's experience when another
would not be qualified after five years. It seems to us purely arbitrary to say that no one
is qualified to act as a pilot because he has not had any fixed period of deck experience."
And see cases cited note 1 supra.
25. Factors mentioned by the Court to sustain the connection between nepotism and a
safe pilotage system, such as ".... the advantages of early experience under friendly
supervision in the locality of the pilot's training, the benefits to morale and esprit do
corps which family and neighborly tradition might contribute, the close association In
which pilots must work and live in their pilot communities and on the water, and the
discipline which is imposed to assure the State competent pilot service appointment. ."
[67 Sup. Ct. 910, 916 (1947)], are of dubious validity when applied to federally-licensed
pilots with fifteen years experience.
26. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
27. And declared unconstitutional a statute which, although fair on its face, had been
unequally administered. Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943). The legalistic diffi-
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entitled to any greater protection. Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme Court
has held that a union certified under the Railway Labor Act to act as exclu-
sive bargaining agent is, in effect, a governmental agency and is barred by the
Fifth Amendment from establishing discriminatory membership require-
ments.28 In the instant case, Louisiana has authorized the formation of what
amounts to a pilots' union, given it a dosed shop, and permitted it to maintain
discriminatory membership requirements. Such discrimination by a state
would appear to be as much subject to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment as was the action of the Kansas union to the Fifth Amendment.p
The Court's decision may seem less surprising when it is realized that the
case marks the intersection of two conflicting lines of doctrine-judicial self-
restraint in the field of state control of economic affairs and judicial activism
in the field of state limitations of civil rights3 0 But the paramount positioq of
culty of applying the Yick Wo case to the Kotch situation is, of course, that plaintiff in
the former case had met all the statutory requirements and was denied a license solely
because he was a Chinese whereas plaintiffs in the Kotch case have not met the statutory
requirements.
28. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946), 56 YA.. L. J. 731 (1947). Cf.
James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Bautista v. Jones, 25
Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 243 (1943) ; Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123
N. J. Eq. 347, 197 AtL. 720 (Ch. 1938). But cf. Four Plating Co. Inc v. Mako, 122
N. J. Eq. 298 (Ch. 1937); Greenwood v. Bldg. Trades Council of Sacramento, 71 Cal.
App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925).
29. But ef. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Louisiana cx rel. Francis v. Res-
weber, 67 Sup. Ct. 374, 377 (1947) (in administration of criminal law, constitutional
standards applicable to federal government not necessarily applicable to states).
30. There is, moreover, some precedent which would explain the votes of individual
members of the court. Mir. Justice Black's position, for example, may perhaps be more
readily explicable in the light of his e.xtreme aversion to striking down state statutes
without a direct Congressional mandate. See his dissents in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) ; McCarrol v. Dbde Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176,
183 (1940) ; J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938). But cf. West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943), where he
joined with Mir. Justice Douglas, a dissenter in the instant case, in repudiating his con-
currence in the Gobitis decision, where he had placed states' rights above individual lib-
erties. And in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946), he concurred reluctantly
in the invocation of the commerce power to invalidate a state statute providing for racial
segregation in interstate busses.
In the field of business regulation, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has departed completely
from the stand he took beside Mir. Justice Black in the Dixie Greyhound case, Freeman
v. Hewit, 67 Sup. Ct. 274 (1947), but it is not surprising to find him with the majority
here, in view of his striking dissent in the Barsette case, as well as his dissents in the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases, 319 U.S. 134 (1943). It should be noted that his concurrence
in the Morgan Case, 328 U.S. 373, 388, carefully avoids the civil rights issue.
Mr. Justice Burton, another member of the majority, should be remembered as the
lone dissenter in the Morgan case-a position from which his stand here cannot be de-
duced, but may perhaps be implied. Although the voting record of the Chief Justice in
civil liberties cases is too brief to permit of definitive comment, he appears to have shown
a consistent bias towards the support of established governmental authority. Mr. Justice
19471 1281
1282 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.56
civil liberties would seem to call for a positive policy of judicial protection
rather than a negative policy of self-abnegation. 81
Jackson's vote is most difficult to account for. He is less hesitant than some of his
brethren to intervene in state affairs without specific Congressional authorization, Duck-
worth v. Arkansas 314 U.S. 390, 397 (1941), and he wrote the opinion of the court in the
Barnette case, sujpra. But the temper of his opinions suggests that the Board's "efficiency"
argument might have found in him a sympathetic auditor, and he, unlike Justices Murphy
and Rutledge, has more often placed other values above civil liberties. See, e.g., Douglas
v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943) (householder's right of privacy).
31. Cf. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310'U.S. 586,
601 (1940), overruled, Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Mr. Justice
Harlan dissenting in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26, 62 (1883).
